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MENTAL DISORDER AS AN EXEMPTION FROM
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE ABA-IRR TASK
FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Christopher Slobogin'
As explained by Ronald Tabak in his introduction to this Symposium,
the Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty (Task Force)
established by the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section of the
American Bar Association (ABA-IRR) has proposed that the ABA
adopt three recommendations concerning the role of mental disability in
capital cases. The first two recommendations call for a prohibition on
execution of offenders whose mental disorder rendered them less
culpable at the time of the offense, and the third would prohibit
execution of those whose mental disability currently renders them
incompetent to pursue appeals or to be executed. This Article discusses
the first two, culpability-related, recommendations. With respect to each
recommendation, this Article first presents the language of the
recommendation, then provides the related commentary currently
approved by the Task Force (which, as an unofficial reporter for the Task
Force, I had a significant hand in writing), and finally engages in a brief
discussion of some of the controversies that each recommendation might
occasion.
1. INTELLECTUAL DEFICIENCY AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Black Letter
The first recommendation of the Task Force's proposal reads as
follows: "Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at
the time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual,
social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental retardation,
dementia, or a traumatic brain injury."1 This recommendation is meant to
exempt from the death penalty persons charged with capital offenses
who have significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and
* Stephen C. O'Connell, Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College
of Law. The author was a member of the American Bar Association Section of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty.
1. Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1115, § 1 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force Recommendations].
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adaptive skills. Its primary purpose is to implement the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Atkins v. Virginia,2 which declared that
execution of offenders with mental retardation violates the cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition in the Eighth Amendment The Court
based this decision both on a determination that a "national consensus"
had been reached that people with mental retardation should not be
executed,4 and on its own conclusion that people with retardation who
kill are not even as culpable or deterrable as the "average murderer,"
much less the type of murderer who deserves the death penalty.5
B. Task Force Commentary6
While the Atkins Court clearly prohibited execution of people with
retardation, it did not define that term. The recommendation embraces
the language most recently endorsed by the American Association of
Mental Retardation, which defines mental retardation as a disability
originating before the age of eighteen that is "characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills."7  The
language of the recommendation is also consistent with the most recent
edition of the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which defines a person as
mentally retarded if, before the age of eighteen, he or she exhibits
"[s]ignificantly subaverage intellectual functioning[,]" (defined as "an IQ
of approximately 70 or below") and "[c]oncurrent deficits or
impairments in present adaptive functioning . . . in at least two of the
following areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety."8 Both of
2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3. Id. at 321.
4. Id. at 313-17.
5. Id. at 318-21.
6. Report, Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Established by
the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association
(approved as of date of publication, on file with the Catholic University Law Review)
(additional footnotes have been added for reference purposes).
7. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION 13 tbl.1.2
(10th ed. 2002).
8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 49 (text rev. 4th ed. 2000). For further elaboration on how mental retardation
should be defined and assessed in the capital sentencing context, see James W. Ellis,
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 11-19 (2003), and Richard J. Bonnie, The American
Psychiatric Association's Resource Document on Mental Retardation and Capital
[Vol. 54:11331134
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these definitions were referenced (albeit not explicitly endorsed) by the
Supreme Court in Atkins,9 and have been models for those states that
have defined the term for purposes of the death penalty exemption.'
Both capture the universe of people whom, if involved in crime, Atkins
describes as less culpable and less deterrable than the "average"
criminal;" as the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders indicates, even a person with only
"mild" mental retardation has a mental age below that of a teenager. 2
The language in this recommendation also encompasses dementia and
traumatic brain injury, disabilities very similar to mental retardation in
their impact on intellectual and adaptive functioning except that they
always (in the case of dementia) or often (in the case of head injury) are
manifested after age eighteen. Dementia resulting from the aging
process is seldom treatable and is associated with a number of deficits in
intellectual and adaptive functioning, such as agnosia (failure to
recognize or identify objects) and disturbances in executive functioning
connected with planning, organizing, sequencing, and abstracting. 3 The
same symptoms can be experienced by people with serious brain injury.
Of course, people with dementia or a traumatic head injury severe
enough to result in "significant limitations in both their intellectual
Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 304, 305-
08 (2004).
9. 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
10. As of April, 2005, twenty-six states define mental retardation for purposes of the
death penalty. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE STATUTES PROHIBITING THE
DEATH PENALTY FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/article.php?scid=28&did=138 (last visited May 24, 2005) [hereinafter DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., PROHIBITING THE DEATH PENALTY]; DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., STATES THAT HAVE CHANGED THEIR STATUTES TO COMPLY WITH THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=28&did=668 (last visited May 24, 2005) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT]. Fourteen of these states, like the
American Association on Mental Retardation definition, have no IQ cut-off, although
many of these do require "significantly subaverage" intellectual functioning. DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., PROHIBITING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra; DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT, supra. The remaining twelve states
use a definition similar to the American Psychiatric Association's (usually requiring an IQ
lower than seventy), although five of these states provide that a higher IQ leads only to a
"presumption" that the person is not mentally retarded. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
PROHIBITING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CIR., COMPLY
WITH THE SUPREME COURT, supra.
11. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
12. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8, at 43 (stating that people with "mild"
mental retardation acquire "academic skills up to approximately the sixth-grade level[,]"
amounting to the maturity of a twelve-year-old).
13. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8, at 171 (describing symptoms of
dementia).
2005] 1135
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functioning and adaptive behavior" rarely commit capital offenses. If
they do, however, the reasoning in Atkins should apply and an exemption
is warranted, because the only significant characteristic that differentiates
these severe disabilities from mental retardation is the age of onset.
4
C. Possible Controversies
A number of controversies arise in connection with this
recommendation. Although this Symposium is meant to focus on people
with mental illness rather than people with mental retardation, these
issues are worth canvassing here because a version of each also arises in
connection with the prohibition on execution of people with mental
illness, the subject of the second recommendation discussed in this
Article.
Because it directly confronts the Court's decision in Atkins, the most
fundamental objection to the ABA's first recommendation is the claim
that the exemption it endorses is overinclusive. As Justice Scalia asked
in his dissent in Atkins, "what scientific analysis can possibly show that a
mildly retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is 'no
more culpable' than the 'average' murderer in a holdup-gone-wrong or a
domestic dispute?"' 5 The concerns here are twofold: (1) culpability is an
individualized assessment, not a categorical one; and (2) exempting an
entire category of people from capital punishment stigmatizes everyone
in the group, in this case people with mental retardation, because it
suggests that they lack certain attributes of personhood that the rest of us
16possess.
Both of these concerns are exaggerated. An exemption from capital
punishment based on a category such as mental retardation is hardly a
declaration that these people cannot be held accountable for their
actions. Indeed, as the Task Force's recommendation makes clear, the
provision only provides immunization from capital punishment; those
covered may still be convicted and sentenced to a prison term, including
a life sentence. Rather, the exemption merely states that no one with the
designated mental disorder could possibly be so depraved that he or she
deserves the ultimate punishment of death. As the Supreme Court has
stated on several occasions, including Atkins, the death penalty is
reserved for the worst of the worst. 7 People with significant mental
14. Compare id. (symptoms of dementia), with id. at 151 (symptoms of retardation).
15. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. For a good elaboration of this argument by a disability rights advocate, see
Donald N. Bersoff, Some Contrarian Concerns About Law, Psychology, and Public Policy,
26 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 565, 568-69 (2002).
17. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("[T]he culpability of the average murderer is insufficient
to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State .... "); see also Godfrey v.
1136 [Vol. 54:1133
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disorder at the time of the offense may often be culpable enough to
deserve conviction for murder, but they are never as culpable as the
consummately evil killer envisioned by the Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence.
Further, it is hard to see how endorsement of that sentiment
dehumanizes people with retardation. A categorical exemption in the
unique context of capital punishment says nothing about the capacity of
people with retardation to function in other settings. If anything, the
exemption described in this recommendation severs mental disability
from the erroneous stereotype, described in more detail below, 8 that
serious mental impairment and depravity somehow conjom. 9
A second controversy raised by Atkins and this first recommendation
from the ABA Task Force is definitional: Precisely what is "mental
retardation" for purposes of the death penalty exemption? While fixing
the culpability cutoff at a particular IQ number, such as seventy, is
alluring, the recommendation makes clear that something more is
required. No current definition of mental retardation rests on IQ score
alone; evaluation of the person's "adaptive functioning" is also crucial.
Unfortunately, that concept, which looks at deficits in skill areas ranging
from communication to leisure, is a very amorphous one.20 Further, IQ
tests themselves are not always reliable," as evidenced by one capital
case in which the same individual was found to have 10 scores of
seventy-two, sixty-seven, sixty-nine, seventy, fifty-seven, sixty-five, and
seventy-four within a several year period.2 Finally, even assuming a
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (setting aside a death sentence because the crime did
not reflect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder").
18. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
19. For further discussion of the categorical approach taken by Atkins, see
Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins the Antithesis or Apotheosis of Anti-Discrimination
Principles?: Sorting Out the Groupwide Effects of Exempting People with Mental
Retardation from the Death Penalty, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1101. 1101-07 (2004).
20. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1994) (expressing confusion
over the definition of adaptive behavior because the legislature, when it banned execution
of people with retardation, provided no definition of the term).
21. David L. Rumley, A License To Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally
Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1329-40 (1993) (discussing the
unreliability of IQ tests).
22. State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1239 (Ariz. 2003). Some of the "unreliability" in such
cases may also be due to improvements in mental capacity. For instance, Daryl Atkins,
whose pre-offense IQ was fifty-nine, scored seventy-four on his latest IQ test, apparently
in part because of "'his constant contact with the many lawyers that worked on his case.'"
Adam Liptak, Inmate's Rising I.Q. Score Could Mean His Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2005, at 11 (quoting Dr. Evans Nelson). In such cases, the pre-offense IQ is the most
relevant, since the Atkins decision is based on an assessment of capacity at the time of the
20051 1137
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reliable IQ score can be obtained, the weight it should carry is unclear.
As Douglas Mossman states:
When conscientious mental health professionals interpret IQ
scores and plan treatment interventions, they keep in mind that
someone who scores 69 on an IQ test is practically
indistinguishable from someone who scores 71, and that two
persons with an IQ of, say, 67 and 73 have much more in
common with each other than with a person who scores 88.23
In short, the courts have their work cut out for them in determining
where death penalty-worthiness begins and ends. Clinical opinion on IQ
assessments will have to be monitored closely, and the definition of
adaptive functioning may need judicial fine-tuning. But courts and
legislatures have already made significant progress in this regard.24
A third and final controversy that arises in connection with this
recommendation has to do with procedure. When is the decision about
mental retardation made, by whom, and using what standard of proof?
Most states take the efficiency-optimal stance that the decision be made
by the judge prior to trial, so as to avoid the expenditure of resources
associated with a capital proceeding.25 But, as James Ellis has pointed
26out, the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, which interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to require jury determination of sentencing factors
that enhance punishment beyond what is required by a capital murder
verdict,27 may mean the retardation question must be put to a jury.28 If
offense, not at the time of execution. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 308-09, 308 n.4
(2002) (relying on evidence of Atkins's mental state at the time of initial incarceration).
23. Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L.
REV. 255, 268 (2003).
24. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-
2.1 (Michie 2000); In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 554-58 (Cal. 2005); Chase v. State, 873
So. 2d 1013, 1023 (Miss. 2004). See generally Nava Feldman, Annotation, Application of
Constitutional Rule of Atkins v. Virginia That Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons
Constitutes "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" in Violation of Eighth Amendment, 122
A.L.R.5TH 145 (2004). For further discussion of the difficulties of defining mental
retardation for Atkins purposes, see Alexis Krulish Dowling, Comment, Post-Atkins
Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 773. 788-97 (2003) and Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2565, 2570-81 (2003).
25. Ellis, supra note 8, at 14.
26. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
27. Id. at 609 (holding invalid a statute providing that the sentencing judge may
determine the aggravating factors required for imposition of the death penalty, when
those factors "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense"'
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000))).
28. Ellis, supra note 8, at 16.
[Vol. 54:11331138
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so, the government will have to prove to a jury that the person is not
29
retarded beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Black Letter
All of these issues also arise in some form in connection with the
second recommendation proffered by the Task Force. This
recommendation reads as follows:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if at the
time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability
that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the
nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (b) to
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. A disorder
manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable
solely to the acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other
drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or
disability for purposes of this provision.30
This recommendation is meant to prohibit execution of persons with
severe mental disabilities whose demonstrated impairments of mental
and emotional functioning at the time of the offense would render a
death sentence disproportionate to their culpability. The
recommendation uses the phrase "disorder or disability" because, even
though those words are often used interchangeably, some prefer one
over the other. However, it also indicates that only those individuals
with "severe" disorders or disabilities are to be exempted from the death
penalty, and it specifically excludes from the exemption those diagnosed
with conditions that are primarily manifested by criminal behavior and
those whose abuse of psychoactive substances, standing alone, renders
them impaired at the time of the offense.
B. Task Force Commentary
3
1
The rationale for this recommendation flows from long-established
principles of Anglo-American law that the Supreme Court recognized
29. Id. Ellis also points out that states could leave the initial decision with the judge,
as long as a finding of non-retardation by the judge can later be challenged in front of the
jury. Id.
30. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 1, § 2.
31. Report, Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Established by
the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association
(approved as of date of publication, on file with the Catholic University Law Review)
(additional footnotes have been added for reference purposes).
2005] 1139
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and embraced in Atkins and recently affirmed in Roper v. Simmons,32
where it held that execution of juveniles who commit crimes while under
the age of eighteen is also prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."3 In
reaching its holding in Atkins, the Court emphasized that execution of
people with retardation is inconsistent with both the retributive and
deterrent functions of the death penalty.34 More specifically, as noted
above, it held that people with retardation are both less culpable and less
deterrable than the average murderer because of their "diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others."35 As the Court concluded, "If the culpability of the average
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to
the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely
does not merit that form of retribution. ,36 Similarly, with respect to
deterrence, the Court stated, "[e]xempting the mentally retarded from
[the death penalty] will not affect the 'cold calculus that precedes the
decision' of other potential murderers.,
37
The Court made analogous observations in Simmons. With respect to
culpability, the majority in that case stated:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's
moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the
wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the
law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability
or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity."
On the deterrence issue it asserted, "'[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent.'
39
The same reasoning applies to people who, in the words of the
recommendation, have "a severe mental disorder or disability that [at the
time of the offense] significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate
32. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190, 1198 (2005).
33. Id. at 1200.
34. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002).
35. Id. at 318.
36. Id. at 319.
37. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
38. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
39. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(alteration in original)).
[Vol. 54:11331140
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the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (b) to
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law.",40 Offenders who meet these
requirements, even if found sane at trial, are not as culpable or
deterrable as the average offender. A close examination of this
recommendation's language makes clear why this is so.
1. The Severe Mental Disorder or Disability Requirement
First, the predicate for eligibility under this recommendation is that
offenders have a "severe" disorder or disability, which is meant to signify
a disorder that is roughly equivalent to disorders that mental health
professionals would consider the most serious, "Axis I diagnoses.
4 1
These disorders include schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders,
mania, major depressive disorder, and dissociative disorders-with
schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder seen in capital
defendants. In their acute state, all of these disorders are typically
associated with delusions (fixed, clearly false beliefs), hallucinations
(clearly erroneous perceptions of reality), extremely disorganized
thinking, or very significant disruption of consciousness, memory, and
perception of the environment. Some conditions that are not
considered Axis I conditions might also, on rare occasions, become
"severe" as that word is used in this recommendation. For instance,
some people whose predominant diagnosis is a personality disorder,
which is an Axis II disorder, may at times experience more significant
dysfunction. Thus, people with borderline personality disorder can
experience "psychotic-like symptoms . . . during times of stress.
44
However, only if these more serious symptoms occur at the time of the
capital offense would the predicate for this recommendation's exemption
be present.
4
40. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 1, § 2.
41. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8, at 27-28 (describing Axis I diagnoses
and distinguishing them from Axis II diagnoses).
42. Id.; L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Time for a Legislative Change: Florida's
Stagnant Standard Governing Competency for Execution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 335, 367
(2004).
43. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8, at 298-301 (schizophrenia); id. at 329
(delusional disorders); id. at 362 (mood disorder with psychotic features); id. at 136-37
(delirium); id. at 519 (dissociative disorders).
44. See id. at 708.
45. On this latter point, a recent statement by the Supreme Court in a case construing
Atkins is worth noting. In Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004), the Court stated that
"[n]othing in our opinion [in Atkins] suggested that a mentally retarded individual must
establish a nexus between her mental capacity and her crime before the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on executing her is triggered," id. at 2571-72. Perhaps this
statement is merely meant to reflect the clinical reality that mental retardation is a
2005]
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2. The Significant Impairment Requirement
To ensure that the exemption only applies to offenders who are
substantially less culpable and less deterrable than the average murderer,
the recommendation further requires that the disorder significantly
impair cognitive or volitional functioning at the time of the offense.
Atkins held that the death penalty is excessive for every person with
mental retardation, and the Supreme Court therefore dispensed with a
case-by-case assessment of responsibility.46 The Task Force decided that
for the disorders covered by this recommendation, however, preclusion
of a death sentence based on diagnosis alone would not be sensible,
because their symptoms are much more variable than those associated
with mental retardation.
The first specific type of impairment that the recommendation
recognizes as a basis for exemption from the death penalty (if due to
severe disorder at the time of the offense) is a significant incapacity "to
appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness" of the conduct
associated with the offense (in section (a)). This provision is meant to
encompass the many individuals with severe disorders who have serious
difficulty appreciating the wrongfulness of their criminal conduct. For
instance, people who, because of psychosis, erroneously perceived their
victims to be threatening them with serious harm would be covered by
this language 4 7 as would delusional offenders who believed that God had
ordered them to commit the offense."
Section (a) also refers to offenders who fail to appreciate the "nature"
and "consequences" of the crime. This language would clearly apply to
offenders who, because of severe disorder or disability, did not intend to
engage in the conduct constituting the crime or were unaware they were
committing it.4 9 It would also apply to delusional offenders who intended
to commit the crime and knew that the conduct was wrongful, but
experienced confusion and self-referential thinking that prevented them
relatively stable condition. In any event, the Task Force's second recommendation, in
contrast to the Court's statement in Tennard, clearly would require the individual to
establish "a nexus" between the mental disability and the crime.
46. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).
47. This is a fairly common perception of people with schizophrenia who commit
violent acts. See Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Aggressive Attributional
Style and Violence by Psychiatric Patients, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 399,
401-02 (2003).
48. Cf People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915) (stating that if a person has
"an insane delusion that God has appeared to [him] and ordained the commission of a
crime, we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong").
49. These offenders would not have the mens rca for murder, and perhaps not even
meet the voluntary act requirement for crime. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
405-06 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the voluntary act requirement under the common law).
1142 [Vol. 54:1133
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from recognizing its full ramifications. For example, a person who
experiences delusional beliefs that electric power lines are implanting
demonic curses, and thus comes to believe that he or she must blow up a
city's power station, might understand that destruction of property and
taking the law into one's own hands is wrong, but might nonetheless fail
to appreciate that the act would harm and perhaps kill those who relied
on the electricity.
The second type of impairment recognized as a basis for exemption
from the death penalty under this recommendation (in section (b)) is a
significant incapacity "to exercise rational judgment in relation to
conduct" at the time of the crime. Numerous commentators have argued
that irrationality is the core determinant of diminished responsibility °
As used by these commentators, and as made clear by the
recommendation's threshold requirement of severe mental disability,
"irrational" judgment in this context does not mean "inaccurate,"
"unusual," or "bad" judgment. Rather, it refers to the type of
disoriented, incoherent, and delusional thinking that only people with
serious mental disability experience. Furthermore, the recommendation
requires that the irrationality occur in connection with the offense, rather
than simply preexist the criminal conduct. 51
Under these conditions, offenders who come within section (b) would
often also fail to appreciate the "nature, consequences, or wrongfulness
of their conduct." But there is a subset of severely impaired individuals
who may not meet the latter test and yet should still be exempt from the
death penalty because they are clearly not as culpable or deterrable as
the average murderer. For instance, a jury rejected Andrea Yates's
insanity defense despite strong evidence of psychosis at the time she
drowned her five children.52 Apparently, the jury believed that, even
though her delusions existed at the time of the offense,53 she could still
appreciate the wrongfulness (and the fatal consequences) of her acts.
Yet that same jury spared Yates the death penalty, probably because it
believed her serious mental disorder significantly impaired her ability to
exercise rational judgment in relation to the conduct.54
50. See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 218 (1979); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY 244-45 (1984); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 215-16 (1991); Stephen J. Morse,
Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1997).
51. See supra note 45.
52. Yates v. State, Nos. 01-02-00462-CR, 01-02-00463-CR, 2005 WL 20416, at *1-4
(Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2005).
53. Id. at *3.
54. For a description of the Yates case, see Deborah W. Denno, Who Is Andrea
Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 1-5 (2003).
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The third and final type of offense-related impairment recognized as a
basis for exemption from the death penalty by the recommendation is a
significant incapacity "to conform [one's] conduct to the requirements of
the law" (section (c)). Most people who meet this definition will
probably also experience significant cognitive impairment at the time of
the crime. However, some may not. For instance, people who have a
mood disorder with psychotic features might understand the
wrongfulness and consequences of their acts, but nonetheless feel
impervious to punishment because of delusion-inspired grandiosity.'-
Because a large number of offenders can make plausible claims that they
felt compelled to commit their crimes, enforcement of the
recommendation's requirement that impairment arise from a "severe"
disorder is especially important here.
3. Exclusions
In addition to the severe disability threshold and the requirement of
significant cognitive or volitional impairment at the time of the offense, a
third way the recommendation assures that those it exempts from the
death penalty are less culpable and deterrable than the average murderer
is to exclude explicitly from its coverage those offenders whose disorder
is "manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable
solely to the acute effects of . . . alcohol or other drugs."56  The
recommendation's reference to mental disorders "manifested primarily
by repeated criminal conduct" is meant to deny the death penalty
exemption to those offenders whose only diagnosis is antisocial
personality disorder or something similar.57 This language is virtually
identical to language in the Model Penal Code's (MPC) insanity
formulation that was designed to achieve the same purpose.5" However,
the recommendation uses the word "primarily" where the MPC uses the
word "only" because Antisocial Personality Disorder consists of a
number of symptom traits in addition to antisocial behavior, and
therefore the MPC's language does not achieve its intended effect.
Compared to the MPC's provision, then, the recommendation's language
Yates's conviction was recently overturned by an appeals court on the ground that expert
testimony in the case was prejudicially misleading. Yates, 2005 WL 20416, at *1.
55. Id. at 362.
56. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 1, § 2.
57. AM. PSYCHtATRIc ASS'N, supra note 8, at 706 (defining as a symptom of
antisocial personality disorder "failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest").
58. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962) (stating that "'mental disease or
defect"' as used in the insanity formulation "do[es] not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct"); see also id. § 4.01 cmt.4.
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broadens the category of offenders whose responsibility is not considered
sufficiently diminished to warrant exemption from capital punishment.
Similarly, this recommendation denies the death penalty exemption to
those offenders who lack appreciation or control of their actions at the
time of the offense due "solely to the acute effects of voluntary use of
60
alcohol or other drugs."5 9 Substance abuse often plays a role in crime.
When voluntary ingestion of psychoactive substances compromises an
offender's cognitive or volitional capacities, the law sometimes is willing
to reduce the grade of offense at trial, especially in murder cases,6' and
evidence of intoxication should certainly be taken into account if it isS 6 2
offered in mitigation in a capital sentencing proceeding. However, in
light of the wide variability in the effects of alcohol and other drugs on
mental and emotional functioning, voluntary intoxication alone does not
warrant an automatic exclusion from the death penalty.63 At the same
time, this recommendation is not meant to prevent exemption from the
death penalty for those offenders whose substance abuse has caused
organic brain disorders or who have other serious disorders that, in
combination with the acute effects of substance abuse, may have
impaired appreciation or control at the time of the offense.
64
4. How This Recommendation Relates to the Insanity Defense
As any student of the insanity defense knows, the language proposed
in the recommendation is similar to modern formulations of the insanity
defense. 6' Nonetheless, in light of the narrow reach of the defense in
59. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 1, § 2.
60. See, e.g., James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug-Free and Stay on Release,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 69-70 (1988).
61. See LAFAVE, supra note 49, at 415-16.
62. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the
Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 679 n.237
(2004) (listing statutes and judicial decisions from over a dozen states that have recognized
intoxication as a mitigating circumstance).
63. In Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), a plurality of the Supreme Court held
that the voluntary intoxication defense is not constitutionally required, id. at 56 (plurality
opinion). At least thirteen states now reject the voluntary intoxication defense. See Molly
McDonough, Sobering Up, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 28, 28. Another commentator has
asserted that "[i]ntoxication [d]efenses [a]re [e]ssentially [u]navailable as [c]urrently
[c]onstrued." Meghan Paulk Ingle, Note, Law on the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses
Are Being Eighty-Sixed, 55 VAND. L. REV. 607, 631 (2002).
64. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8, at 170 (describing dementia due
to prolonged substance abuse).
65. The language in 2(a) and 2(c), for instance, is almost identical to the language in
the Model Penal Code's insanity formulation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
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most states (and its abolition in a few), 6' many offenders who meet these
criteria will still be convicted rather than acquitted by reason of insanity.
Even in those states with insanity formulations that are very similar to
the recommendation's language, these individuals might be convicted,
67for a whole host of reasons; in such cases, the recommendation would
require juries and judges to revisit the extent to which cognitive and
volitional impairment diminished the responsibility of the offender. This
approach rests on the traditional understanding that significant cognitive
or volitional impairment attributable to a severe disorder or disability
often renders the death penalty disproportionate to defendants'
culpability even if it does not exempt defendants from punishment
altogether. It also underlies the various doctrinal formulations of
diminished responsibility that predated the contemporary generation of
capital sentencing statutes.69
5. How This Recommendation Relates to Mitigating Factors
This recommendation sets up, in effect, a conclusive "defense" against
the death penalty for capital defendants who can demonstrate the
requisite level of impairment due to severe disorder at the time of the
offense. It must be remembered, however, that the criteria in the
recommendation do not exhaust the relevance of mental disorder or
disability in capital sentencing. Those offenders whose mental disorder
or disability at the time of the offense was not severe or did not cause
one of the enumerated impairments would still be entitled to argue that
66. Today, five states do not have an insanity defense, Christopher Slobogin, An End
To Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV.
1199, 1214 (2000), only about twenty states still recognize volitional impairment as a basis
for the defense, RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 534-
36 (4th ed. 2004), and many states define the cognitive prong in terms of an inability to
"know" (as opposed to "appreciate") the wrongfulness of the act or, as is true in federal
court, leave out the word "substantial" in the phrase "lack of substantial capacity to
appreciate" in the MPC formulation, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
67. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me":
The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1383-1416 (1997) (exploring reasons for hostility to
the insanity defense).
68. See Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness As an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 297 (1989). Berkman notes:
Nearly two dozen jurisdictions list as a statutory mitigating circumstance the fact
that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct was
substantially impaired, often as a result of mental defect or disease. An equally
high number of states includes "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" as a
mitigating factor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
69. See generally S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1925).
1146 [Vol. 54:1133
HeinOnline  -- 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1146 2004-2005
The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations
their mental dysfunction is a mitigating factor, to be considered with
aggravating factors and other mitigating factors in determining whether
capital punishment should be imposed.70
C. Controversies
One objection to this recommendation might be that it describes
offenders who are not as impaired as those exempted under Atkins. In
fact, however, an offender who meets the strict criteria in this
recommendation is likely to experience more dysfunction at the time of
the offense than the typical offender with retardation. Most of the
people covered by the recommendation's language will be afflicted with
some type of psychotic symptomatology at the time they commit their
crime. Thus, their criminal behavior will be influenced by delusions,
hallucinations, or other signs of gross irrationality that seriously diminish
both culpability and deterrability.
But, some might object, people with psychosis and similar mental
problems are still more "at fault" for their condition than people with
mental retardation, because their conditions are more easily and
effectively treated and thus could have been avoided.72 In another
article, I have debunked these kinds of arguments in detail. 3 As I said
there:
First, many people with psychosis are not capable of
recognizing the benefits of medication or the risks of not taking
it. Second, those who do have such capability may nonetheless
resist medication because they know it can have serious side
effects, requires long-term maintenance, and is unevenly
successful. Finally, even those who might want medication can
have good reasons for not being on it. As one study indicated,
most people with mental disorders do not seek treatment
because they "do not realize that effective treatments exist,...
70. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (requiring instructions making
clear that the jury can "consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence" of mental
disorder).
71. Note that only one state, Connecticut, prohibits execution of an offender who
experienced serious mental illness at the time of the offense. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-46a(h)(3) (West 2001) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty when "the
defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to
conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired").
72. Research shows that an offender's "culpability" for creating an excusing
condition (e.g., failing to take medication) can significantly affect culpability assessments.
See Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Culpability
Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 447, 462 (1995).
73. See Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental
Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 309-11 (2003).
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fear discrimination because of the stigma attached to mental
illness[, or are unable to] afford treatment because they lack
insurance that would cover it.
''74
In any event, the culpability associated with failing to take medication,
even if the failure is intentional, hardly equates to the type of culpability
necessary to warrant a penalty of death. Only if a refusal to maintain
treatment occurred with awareness that violence would likely result
might one argue there is a link between nontreatment and criminal
liability.75
A second likely concern about this recommendation stems from the
perceived difficulty of accurately diagnosing the conditions it describes.
As a general matter, psychosis and related conditions, all of which are
associated with conspicuous symptoms, are no more prone to
misdiagnosis than mental retardation, evaluation of which, as previous
discussion noted, has its own challenges] 6 But there are thrce differences
between the conditions described in this recommendation and those
encompassed by the first recommendation that might increase the
likelihood of mistake in implementing the provision under discussion.
First, the mental disorders it describes are somewhat more easily feigned
than mental retardation.7 Second, because of the variability of those
conditions, this recommendation requires much more of a speculative
retrospective judgment than the recommendation regarding offenders
with intellectual deficiency, which focuses primarily on an assessment of
present mental status. 78 Finally, this recommendation requires not only
evaluation of cognitive dysfunction (which is the primary focus of an
74. Id. at 311 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Robert Pear, Few
Seek To Treat Mental Disorders Common, U.S. Says; Many Not Treated, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1999, at Al).
75. See Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1985) (arguing that
one who "causes" his defense should be denied it only when, "at the time that the actor
engages in his initial conduct [e.g., failing to take medication] he has a culpable state of
mind as to causing the conduct constituting the offense [e.g., the mens rea for first degree
murder]").
76. Compare supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing the diagnosis of
mental retardation), with REISNER ET AL., supra note 66, at 429 (describing research
finding agreement rates of over eighty percent on the diagnosis of schizophrenia).
77. Compare Mossman, supra note 23, at 276 (stating that "examination of diagnostic
criteria suggests that mental retardation is hard to fake successfully" because the evidence
of retardation must pre-exist the crime), with Richard Rogers, Models of Feigned Mental
Illness, 26 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 182, 184 (1990) (examining studies in forensic
settings which reveal a range of 3.2% to 17.2% frequency of malingered mental illness).
78. Of course, historical information is also necessary to make a diagnosis of mental
retardation, given the age of onset requirement, see supra text accompanying note 8, and
the possibility that IQ can change, see supra note 22.
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assessment for retardation as well), but also, in section (c), of volitional
dysfunction, which is a relatively more difficult enterprise) 9
None of these differences mean that the assessments called for by this
recommendation are impossible, however. Indeed, they are virtually
identical to the evaluations carried out every day in the criminal justice
system in connection with the insanity defense. Furthermore, the threat
of malingering is, in practice, minimal,s° and today numerous procedures
exist for improving the reliability of judgments about past mental state.8
In any event, if the evaluations required by this recommendation are
more prone to error, a ready solution exists: the offender can be saddled
with a heavier burden of proving mental disability. Even if Ring requires
that the ultimate burden of proof be placed on the government,8 2 the
burden of producing evidence of disability should obviously be on the
offender, and can be adjusted upward to ensure that his or her claims in
this regard are not frivolous.
While to this point the discussion about the Task Force's second
recommendation has focused on whether it is too broad, some might
believe that it is too narrow, given its placement of the word "severe" in
front of the phrase "mental disorder and disability." Even most insanity
tests, such as the MPC's popular formulation,"3 do not require a severe
mental disorder. The federal test for insanity does resort to that
modifier,8 but that provision was hurriedly enacted after the acquittal of
John Hinckley on insanity grounds,85 and despite strong evidence that the
insanity defense is seldom abused. 6 In any event, the goal in the capital
79. See Seymour L. Hallcck, Clinical Assessment of the Voluntariness of Behavior, 20
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 221, 221 (1992) ("[C]linicians rarely have access to
conceptual or practical guidelines for assessing voluntariness.").
80. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 715 (1990) (concluding that
"malingering among insanity defendants is statistically low and is fairly easy to discover"
(footnotes omitted)).
81. See generally GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR
THE COURTS § 8.06, at 234-41 (2d ed. 1997).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2000) (providing that "[i]t is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts").
85. On the genesis of the federal test and criticisms of it, see RITA J. SIMON & DAVID
E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 49 (1988).
86. The House Judiciary Committee recommended against adoption of the current
provision on the ground that it represented "'a radical departure ... not justified by the
evidence of problems with the current operation of the defense."' MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 97 (1994) (omission in original)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-577, at 15 (1983)).
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sentencing context is to define when mental disability leads to diminished
criminal responsibility, not, as with the insanity defense, its complete
absence. Furthermore, it might be argued, the recommendation's
exclusions for those whose mental disability is manifested primarily by
antisocial behavior or is attributable solely to acute psychoactive
substance abuse would ensure that uncabined use of the exemption
would not occur.
These are worthy objections. But the Task Force wanted to emphasize
that only serious disorder would lead to exemption from the death
penalty. Particularly in light of the large numbers of offenders who
might make plausible claims that they were "irrational," lacked
"appreciation" of the wrongfulness of their conduct, or had difficulty
controlling it,87 the "severe" modifier was felt to be necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
In recent analysis of capital punishment, much emphasis has been
placed, deservedly so, on the possibility that factually innocent people
might be executed.R But there is also another kind of innocence, the
type that stems from the diminished responsibility for criminal acts that is
caused by serious mental disorder. The first two recommendations of the
ABA Section of Rights and Responsibilities' Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty recognize that this brand of innocence
should also lead to an exemption from sentences of death.
There is another justification for these recommendations, one that
focuses on their role as a corrective for the insidious impact of "sanist"
attitudes on the part of legal decision-makers in capital cases. 9 Juries
and judges, like people generally, harbor hostile attitudes toward people
with mental disability.9°  Numerous studies document that capital
sentencing juries tend to devalue evidence of significant mental disorder,
often treating it as an aggravating circumstance rather than a mitigating
87. See Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:
Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates
Trial, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 320-21 (2003) (noting that offenders with impulse disorders,
abnormal brain patterns, and poor upbringing might assert an insanity defense under these
formulations, unless mental disorder is defined restrictively).
88. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, by Risking Execution of the
Innocent, Violate Substantive Due Process?, 40 HOUs. L. REV. 1359, 1360-64 (2004);
Elizabeth R. Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1065-69 (2003); Charles I.
Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus and Justice, 12 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 233, 234-36 (2002).
89. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992). Michael
Perlin coined the term "sanism" to describe irrational prejudice, akin to the prejudice
encompassed with words like sexism and racism, against people with mental disability. Id.
90. See id. at 375-76.
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one.9 And prosecutors routinely play to this bias. In the recent case of
Tennard v. Dretke, for instance, the prosecutor's closing argument
emphasized, in the Supreme Court's words, "that Tennard's low 1Q was
irrelevant in mitigation, but relevant to the question whether he posed a
future danger."92
This kind of reasoning is particularly prejudicial in the capital
sentencing context. Whether or not it is specifically recognized as an
aggravator, 9 dangerousness plays a significant role in jury and judicial
decision-making in capital cases.94 Yet, contrary to the apparent beliefs
of juries and prosecutors, offenders with mental disorder do not pose a
greater risk than their non-disordered counterparts. 5 And even if they
did, Supreme Court case law strongly suggests that mental disorder may
only be considered as a mitigator in capital sentencing proceedings.9
91. See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 669-70 (2000) (describing studies that show juries
treat mental disability as an aggravating circumstance). A recent study concludes that
psychological evidence, especially of schizophrenia and retardation, "can have significant
effects on sentencing outcomes in death penalty litigation." Michelle E. Barnett et al.,
When Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating
Evidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 766 (2004).
However, that study relied on undergraduate responses to vignettes, and simulated only
the sentencing stage of the capital process, meaning that it cannot be known whether the
subjects might have also found the individuals insane at trial. id. at 765-66.
92. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2573 (2004).
93. Only one-sixth of those states with a death penalty (six out of thirty-six) make
dangerousness an explicit aggravating factor. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 66, at 618
n.u.
94. See Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz et al., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and
Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 471, 480 (2004) (finding, in a study
using mock jurors, that concerns about future violent conduct accounted for more
variance in the sentencing decision than other aggravating circumstance); Sally Costanzo
& Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making
Under the Special Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 168 (1994)
(finding, based on interviews of capital sentencing jurors, that jurors tended to spend most
of their deliberation time deciding whether the defendant would be violent if not
executed).
95. James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among
Menially Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 139 (1998)
(documenting a meta-analysis finding that the major predictors of recidivism were the
same for mentally disordered offenders as for nondisordered offenders, and that
psychopathology should be deemphasized as a predictor); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T.
Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism Among Schizophrenic and
Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397, 404 (1992) (finding that
subjects with schizophrenia were less likely to commit offenses upon release than their
nonschizophrenic counterparts).
96. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (stating, in dictum, that it would be
constitutionally impermissible to give aggravating effect to factors such as "race, religion,.
• .political affiliation, . . . or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser
penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness" (citation omitted)).
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The ABA Task Force's two recommendations regarding mental
disability at the time of the offense ensure that at least the most severe
types of mental disorder are treated that way.
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